The Limits of Virtue

Last week The Washington Monthly (June 2003, by Joshua Green) and Newsweek (May 12, 2003, by Jonathan Alter and Joshua Green) broke the story that fueled at least a week's worth of media analysis and commentary. Documents provided to these magazines indicate that during the last decade, Dr. William Bennett, secretary of education under Ronald Reagan, drug czar under George H. W. Bush, has made numerous trips to casinos in Atlantic City and Las Vegas. Sources suggest that he has lost more than $8 million as a "preferred customer" at several establishments, often spending two or three days at a time enjoying his recreational pastime.

That last word--pastime--signals the issue that has the talking heads bobbing. How can the preeminent American evangelist of virtue be engaging in something that for many Americans remains a legalized vice?

Bennett's best-selling anthology, The Book of Virtues, has become a primer in classic conservative morality, reviving a long moral tradition idealizing the practice of civic virtue. Like others before him, Bennett has not defended virtue without at the same time excoriating vice. Last week, public attention was being drawn to Bennett's loud denunciations of "homosexual unions" coupled with his pronounced silence about gambling.

Dr. Bennett is forthright about his hobby. He doesn't gamble the "milk money," he operates within the law, and he stays out of debt. His preferred games are the slot machines and video poker--"gambling for dummies," as someone calls these games, since a monkey trained to insert tokens and pull the levers could score just as well. The instant results of video poker have led many to describe it as the crack cocaine of gambling. When reminded of the costs of divorce, bankruptcy, and family distress that accrue to gambling in America, Bennett compares gambling to drinking alcohol: "If you can't handle it, don't do it." By his own testimony, gambling has never been a moral issue for him; he has been gambling all his life, learning to play bingo at his boyhood Roman Catholic church.

Gambling: right or wrong?

In light of Mr. Bennett's own testimony, it may be helpful to know that Roman Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas believed gambling was permissible, as long as it was not motivated by covetousness, not unfair (loaded dice), or used to exploit the young and immature. Many churches use forms of gambling (bingo, raffles, lottos) to raise funds. For many, gambling is a form of social recreation, an alternative to loneliness for many elderly.

Defenders of recreational and social gambling compare this "use" of money to other uses of money for entertainment (the office pool for tournament play), recreation (golf, seeing a professional sporting contest), and social concourse. Critics argue that gambling glorifies chance, violates the duty of stewardship, obtains gain at another's loss, and appeals to selfishness and greed. Several of these criticisms could be leveled also against a number of television game shows, where contestants win a luxury automobile for guessing the name of the current U.S. president. Moreover, using the element of chance in connection with fundraising for charities will eventually bankrupt benevolence giving, because people will become accustomed to getting something in return for their gift. (For fuller discussion of this, see J. Douma, The Ten Commandments, 345-348.)

The story within the story: a contest of analogies

Those who talk or write about other people for a living have been trying now for a week or more to "help" us identify Bill Bennett's problem. This attempt itself has become as interesting as the original story.

Bill Bennett is a hypocrite, some are saying. He preaches virtue while indulging in vice. His defenders may suppose that Bennett has found the escape from this criticism: his gambling is controlled, and legal. Moreover, he doesn't deny, but (now) openly acknowledges his hobby, admitting, however, that because he has set a bad example for others, he'll stop visiting casinos.

If hypocrisy consists of simulation (pretending or play-acting), the charge doesn't stick, because his hobby has been public. If hypocrisy consists of inconsistency between talk and walk, again his defenders might consider him cleared, because for Bennett, gambling is like drinking, and the essence of moral virtue is moderation in both. Even in his gambling, evangelist Bennett has been practicing the virtues he has been preaching.

Hypocrisy has another face, however. Although Bennett might be immune from the criticisms of simulation and inconsistency, hypocrisy's third face is moral selectivity. Some of his critics seem to be gunning for Bennett because of his particular selection of morally condemnable vices. Homosexual unions? No! Gambling? Okay. Wife-swapping? No! Betting? All right. Video pornography? No! Video poker? Yes!

That's the story within the story. The problem isn't really Mr. Bennett's permission of gambling, but his condemnation of... homosexual unions. By accusing him of moral selectivity, this exposé of his gambling becomes a useful wedge to advance the argument for legalizing homosexual unions. If someone claiming to defend moral virtue permits gambling (which many used to consider a vice, but which is now legal), then by analogy someone else may claim to defend virtue and permit homosexual unions (which many used to consider a vice, but which is not yet legal). This argument has the added bonus of dividing the conservative moralists in America, whose strength has often been found in their shared opposition to a plethora of public evils.

This illustrates, I think, one of the limits of virtue as a basis for moral evaluation and decision. By themselves, virtues like courage, temperance, prudence, and justice cannot discern what is right and what is wrong. Mr. Bennett's defense of his hobby with the claim of being a temperate gambler is a form of begging the question. You see, if gambling is by definition morally wrong, then temperate gambling is akin to moderate adultery. I disagree with his analogy between drinking and gambling, because its clear that the Bible permits the former but condemns the latter.

We need more than virtue. In order to provide moral character with proper direction, virtues must be oriented in terms of a "map," a set of coordinates called norms. Such norms (like the Ten Commandments, the Sermon on the Mount, the New Testament lists of "put ons" and "put offs") identify that direction and supply those coordinates of moral decision, in terms of love toward God, toward neighbor, toward the creation, and toward oneself. Only after those coordinates (norms) have been fixed and arranged are we prepared to discuss the proper route we should travel to reach happiness.

Mr. Bennett and his critics realize, however, that our great cultural disagreement today involves fixing those norms.

The tradition of virtue ethics

To understand the limits of virtue, we need to survey briefly the tradition in which an ethics of virtue became prominent.

In his ethics, the philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) explains how every human soul seeks happiness or pleasure as the purpose of life. The happy life is the good life, since the truly good or virtuous person achieves that for which persons alone are suited. For Aristotle, virtue was the mean between two extremes. Courage is the mean between the extremes of recklessness (too much courage) and cowardice (too little courage). Before Aristotle, Plato (428-348 B.C.) had set forth a doctrine of four cardinal virtues, namely, wisdom, courage, prudence, and justice-all of which reflected his psychology or view of human nature, subject to reason, passion, and desire.

Augustine (354-430) and Aquinas (1225-1274) were two Christian thinkers in church history who adapted these philosophical explanations of moral virtue to a Christian system of ethics. Augustine, for example, filled the natural virtues of prudence, justice, temperance, and courage with Christian content. He saw these four cardinal virtues as manifestations of love, coordinated and cemented with faith and hope. Thomas Aquinas followed Gregory the Great (540-604) by adding to the four natural virtues three theological or Christian virtues (faith, hope, and love). The natural virtues remain incomplete without the theological virtues, which are infused by the Holy Spirit into believers.

Especially in the system of Aquinas, the Christian virtues exist alongside the natural virtues. Though the former are bestowed from above, the latter can be acquired by anybody who follows the laws of nature. These natural virtues function well as public virtues that regulate human society. Here we see the dualism of nature and grace, the governing framework and central thread of Aquinas' thought.

The Reformation modified the tradition of virtue ethics significantly by placing these qualities within a different context. Scripture itself requires attention to habits of the heart manifested in actions and attitudes. Alongside lists of virtues (2 Cor. 6:6; Gal. 5:22; Eph. 4:2-3, 32; 5:9; Phil. 1:9ff.; 4:8; 1 Tim. 4:12; 6:11; 2 Tim. 2:22; Titus 2:12; 1 Pet. 3:8; 2 Pet. 1:5ff.) we find lists of vices (Rom. 1:29ff.; 1 Cor. 5:10-11; 6:9; 2 Cor. 12:20-21; Gal. 5:19ff.; Eph. 4:31; 5:3ff.; Col. 3:5ff.; 1 Pet. 2:1; 4:3,5). All of this can be organized in terms of three aspects or relationships of Christian living: (1) our piety toward God, (2) our righteousness toward our neighbor, and (3) our sensibility with regard to ourselves.

According to Scripture, because a person is justified by faith alone and possesses personal sanctification by faith alone, assurance of salvation cannot depend upon the exercise of virtue or upon progress in virtue. For both Luther and Calvin the order is: faith, then virtue. Faith is not one of a series of virtues, but is the empty hand stretched out to receive our happiness on the basis of Christ's finished work. Christian living is not a gradual improvement from vice to virtue, but a continual drawing from the promises of grace. Virtue is not a substance or quantitative entity that increases with time, but virtue exists in a relationship--to Jesus Christ and his perfection, to the Father and his adoption, to the Spirit and his completion of what has been begun.

Virtues are moral habits, traits born of practice, that constitute character. A solitary robin does not make for Spring, nor does a solitary act of mercy make for a compassionate person. Moral character is cultivated over time, as norms for right and wrong are applied to a variety of life situations. Virtues provide direction and orientation for applying these norms. It is wisdom that forms the bridge between the moral norm and the life situation.

An essential quality of virtue, then, is the capacity to act the right way at the right time. This capacity must be nurtured, tutored, and exercised. What Proverbs exalts in the Old Testament, the apostle Paul champions in the New Testament, namely, growth in knowledge and discernment in order to approve the things that are excellent (Phil. 1:9-10; Col. 1:9-10).

America and virtue ethics

We need to realize that downplaying moral norms and emphasizing moral virtues can be a useful public policy technique for conservatives and liberals alike. Who could be against courage, temperance, prudence, and justice as values that should guide our public policy and inform our cultural identity? Yet, without clarifying the norms that must shape the direction of moral growth, these values remain vague slogans--which just might constitute their usefulness!

We close with a brief look at two features of an ethical system focused exclusively or primarily on virtues, features that make this system especially attractive to Americans.

First, notice the individualist anthropology undergirding the views of Aquinas. Whereas Plato and Aristotle emphasized the social function of virtue within the polis or city-state-society, Aquinas emphasized the connection between virtue and individual happiness or blessedness. Such an individualism comes into its own in determining the mean between two extremes. This approach enshrines subjectivity in moral valuation, since virtue and vice come to be positioned--by the individual moral agent--on a continuum, rather than being seen as good and evil opposed to each other. Loving God with all our heart, soul, mind, and strength, however, is not at all similar to choosing the fulcrum or midpoint between two extremes.

Second, consider the dualist worldview arising from the views of Aquinas. Followers of Aquinas live in a two-storied universe (or multiverse). The upper story is Christian and supernatural, while the ground floor is pluriform and natural. Life gets divided into the "religious" level, where faith operates, and the "moral" level, where reason functions. With the separation between church and state, between religion and politics, many Americans have learned the etiquette needed to survive in such a divided or dualist world.

From this discussion, you should not conclude that paying attention to virtues as necessary elements of morality is a waste of time or an exercise in subversion. You should read Mr. Bennett's book, The Book of Virtues, and read it to your children. But be aware of the limits of virtue. Realize that although character is what counts, a person is not born with a character. A person is born with a nature (sinful) that must be redeemed and transformed by the grace of God, in order to express itself under the guidance of God's precepts, to develop into a character reflecting the image of God in Jesus Christ-iall of which is exactly what we were created to become.