Just War in the 21st Century: Obsolete or Obligatory?

Ever since September 11, 2001, the United States government has been seeking to frame an effective response to international terrorism. To their credit, Bush administration officials have solicited counsel from religious leaders and moral thinkers with a view also to framing an ethical or just response. It is in this context that the principles of "just war" have again come under discussion.

Not only today, but also throughout history people have wondered whether any war is ever justifiable. To this question two answers have emerged: the negative answer of pacifism, and the positive reply of the just war theory.

The classic pacifist response is perhaps best expressed in the Schleitheim Articles of 1527, usually seen as the theological position of Anabaptism. In summary, this position holds that since killing is incompatible with the Christian faith, and since the state wields the sword with worldly rather than spiritual power, then Christians may participate in neither politics nor war.

The just war theory is generally thought to have begun with Augustine, although its development was aided by pre-Christian thinkers like Aristotle and Cicero. The position formulated by Augustine (d. 430) was further refined by Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Fancisco de Vitoria (d. 1546) and Francisco Suárez (d. 1617), and developed still further by Hugo Grotius (d. 1645) and Daniel Webster (d. 1852). Both Martin Luther and John Calvin (Institutes 4.20) wrote as well about the authority of the state to wage just war.

Terms and principles

Participating in the discussion of just war theory requires familiarity with terms and phrases that belong to the topic. Here are several.

• ius ad bellum: literally, "justice toward war"; principles that justify going to war.
• ius in bello: literally, "justice in war"; principles that justify conduct in war
• bellum iustum: just war
• bellum v. duellum: war is the use of force for public ends by public authorities responsible to defend the security of those under their authority; a duel is the use of force for private ends by private individuals.

Here are the just war principles, distinguished and arranged into two classifications.

Deciding to enter upon war, or ius ad bellum, requires:

1. Just cause. Here, the fundamental value to be protected is justice. Classically, this meant that using force was justified in response to one or more of three possibilities: (1) to defend against wrongful attack, (2) to retake something wrongfully taken, and/or (3) to punish evil. War is not just if it is used as an instrument of national policy, or of economic policy, or of ideological expansion.
2. Right intention. Here, the fundamental goal is peace. The goal of all just war is to achieve and restore a just peace, not to maintain lower gasoline prices. Vengeance and territorial conquest are unjust intentions.
3. Competent authority. This criterion protects the fundamental value of order. War must be waged by a legitimate government, not by private individuals or vigilante groups.

These three values of justice, peace, and order they constitute public goods which the government is by nature called to protect; the remaining principles are prudential tests for how the government protects these primary goods, and are thus qualitatively different from the first three criteria.

4. Reasonable chance of success. Here we are interested in evaluating the probable, foreseeable consequences of using force, the effects upon the military foe, upon the region, and upon the ones waging war.
5. Proportionality of ends. Would the good that might be achieved outweigh the evil that would result from not going to war?
6. Last resort. Have all other possible means been used in an effort to resolve the conflict?

Criteria for waging war (ius in bello) requires:

7. Proportionality of means. Combatants must use tactics that ultimately bring about more good than evil. Only sufficient force should be used to restore a just peace. This has led to the outlawing of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
8. Discriminating between civilians and combatants. Although war usually numbers civilians or noncombatants among its victims, prosecuting a just war requires that military actions are intended against combatants only. Theorists recognize the principle of double effect: unintentional (but foreseeable) consequences (viz., civilian casualties) may accompany the intended consequence (restraint of violence).

Starting point

In a number of essays appearing in the journal First Things, Roman Catholic writer George Weigel has shown that some prominent Catholic (and evangelical) discussions of just war theory have proceeded from the wrong presupposition.

Their confusion emerges with their insistence that the just war principles begin with a "presumption against war" or a "presumption against violence." If that is one's starting point, then the principles of just war theory are invoked primarily to restrict the use of force rather than to govern the use of force for proper ends. By contrast, if the starting premise of the just war theory is that these principles seek to protect justice, peace, and order, then these principles serve moral reflection by correlating proper means with acceptable moral ends.

As Weigel has pointed out, the principles of just war are discussed by Thomas Aquinas and others in the context of discussing the duties of charity! In a sinful world, loving those under our protection and authority may require the use of force or, in the case of nations, the waging of war. Under certain circumstances, governments can face a moral obligation to defend the security and order of their citizens by means of war.

The arrangement of principles above is very significant for appreciating the cohesiveness and the dynamic of the just war theory. As we have set them forth, these criteria begin by stipulating the government's duties (justice, peace, and order), expressed in morally appropriate political ends (stated in terms of the success, proportionality, and necessity of force), all of which are served by morally proper means (relating to tactics and targets). Now, if our evaluation of a prospective war begins by assessing the means (the tactics and targets), without first rehearsing the duties of government and the legitimate goals of war, then we will fail to judge war in terms of its positive purpose as a form of public statecraft.

So when we discuss the application of just war principles to, say, a possible U.S. attack against Iraq, we must begin by agreeing about the government's God-given obligation to protect justice, peace, and order-especially for its own citizens.

Modern complications

We must not believe, however, that the application of these principles in our modern global society is simple or easy.

Several factors make modern application of these principles difficult, among them the globalization of politics, the development of nuclear weapons, and the nature of terrorism. Consider the following:

• Since terrorists don't wear uniforms or fight in regiments, how is a combatant to be identified?
• Since terrorists are by definition private warriors (though perhaps loyal to the interests of a government or a religion), how are we to assess the success, proportionality, and necessity of force against an "invisible" enemy?
• Must a legitimate government wait until a rogue state with nuclear capabilities uses these weapons to destroy either its own citizens or its neighbors? In other words, how must we define aggression today?
• If the United Nations lacks political cohesion, political sovereignty, and an effective chain of command, can the UN ever prosecute a just war? Under what conditions is a UN Security Council resolution morally necessary to justify a unilateral or multilateral military action?

Terrorists cannot be deterred by threats of retaliation, and many do not fear suicide, seeing it as a form of religious martyrdom. Preventing nuclear terrorism requires that aspiring nations be prevented from acquiring nuclear-weapons capability, and if they should acquire them, from exporting nuclear devices to terrorists, for which a strategy of military retaliation is likely the only effective deterrent. If terrorists acquire nuclear devices, then the industrialized West will likely rely on conventional strategies for countering terrorism (e.g., border controls, domestic surveillance, security at travel terminals, espionage, and infiltration). Preventing nuclear terrorist acts once terrorists have access to nuclear devices in not a very encouraging prospect.

Some modern interpreters of just war theory agree that the principle of just cause includes the preemptive use of force. The fundamental point at issue in the preemptive use of force is not an imminent threat of attack, but a sufficient threat of attack, evidenced by a leader's willingness to injure, by a nation's defiance of international law, by the active preparation of weapons, and a situation of growing risk.

With the beginning of the twenty-first century we face new political and technological realities that do not render just war theory obsolete. Rather, these realities call for us to develop and refine these principles and their application in the interests of political justice, international peace, and public order. Until the time when swords can be turned into plowshares-that is to say, until the time when sin is finally vanquished-we must urge governments to seek the next best thing, namely, the recovery of peace through the appropriate use of war. Might never makes right, but might may sometimes serve right.

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